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Abstract This paper argues for a re-evaluation of the common assumption that
imperatives cannot appear in (true information seeking) questions. This is challenged
based on new data from Slovenian, which show that imperatives can occur in scope
marking questions. It is proposed that instead of a categorical exclusion of imperative
questions based on clause type, the ban on imperative questions is the result of a
matrix clause version of subject obviation. The proposed analysis not only reduces
the putative “ban on imperative questions” to another independent phenomenon, but
also correctly predicts the behavior of imperatives in scope marking questions.
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1 Imperative questions!?
It is often taken for granted that imperative questions are impossible, and that this
is the reason why constituent questions like (1a) and polar questions like (1b) are
infelicitous — imperatives are viewed as incompatible with interrogatives.1
(1) a. *What sell!? b. *Sell it!?
This can seen even more clearly in languages like Slovenian, which has a dedicated
imperative suffix, as shown by the contrast between (2a) and (2b). In the infelicitous
examples in (3) (paralleling those in (1)), we can thus clearly identify the imperative
suffix co-occuring with a wh-word, as in (3a), or a question particle, as in (3b).2
(2) a. Proda-j-te
sell-IMP-2PL
ga!
3.M.ACC
‘Sell it!’
b. (A)
Q
Ga
3.M.DAT
proda-te?
sell-2PL
‘Will youPL sell it?’
* I would like to thank Jonathan Bobaljik, Stefan Kaufmann, Peet Klecha, Susi Wurmbrand and
especially Magda Kaufmann for discussion and feedback. All remaining errors are my own.
1 I use ‘interrogative’ to refer narrowly to the clause type, and ‘question’ as a more general term.
2 The question particle ‘a’ (‘ali’ in higher registers) is optional in colloquial Slovenian. If dropped,
polar questions are identified via intonation and the clitic cluster being in the 1st clausal position (as
opposed to 2nd). For sake of simplicity, I will omit the particle from subsequent polar questions.
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(3) a. *Kaj
what
proda-j-te?
sell-IMP-2PL
int.: ‘What should youPL sell?’
b. *(A)
Q
Ga
3.M.ACC
proda-j-te?
sell-IMP-2PL
int.: ‘Should youPL sell it?’
Crucially, the infelicity does not result solely from the oddness of the intended
meaning of sentences like (3a) and (3b), since it can be conveyed through alternative
grammatical means. In Slovenian, the intended meaning of the imperative questions
in (3) may be expressed with modal+infinitive constructions, as shown in (4).
(4) a. Kaj
what
mora-te
should-2PL
prodat?
sell.INF
‘What should you sell?’
b. Ga
3.M.ACC
mora-te
should-2PL
prodat?
sell.INF
‘Should you sell it?’
The “ban on imperative questions” must therefore be linked to unique properties
of imperatives and questions, the null hypothesis being that the ban results directly
from clause typing, specifically the idea that there are at least three core universal
clause types — declarative, interrogative, and imperative — which are mutually
exclusive (Sadock & Zwicky 1985), so any clause may only belong to one at a
time. However, imperatives are actually felicitous in echo questions and rhetorical
questions (Kaufmann & Poschmann 2013), so in order to maintain a simplistic clause
type based explanation we would have to retreat to the position that only “true”
information seeking questions belong to the interrogative clause type.
I will not attempt to square this position with the syntactic commonalities that
information seeking questions share with echo and rhetorical questions. In fact, I will
show that an even further retreat is necessary, as there is evidence from Slovenian
that imperatives can be felicitous even in “true” information seeking questions,
specifically in scope marking questions (see Dayal 1993, 2016). I will argue based
on this fact that there is no “ban on imperative questions” per se, but that the badness
of (1) and (3) stems from a binding violation that results from the requirement that
imperatives (and more generally what I call directive clauses/directives) semantically
and syntactically encode the perspective holder of the clause.
1.1 Scope marking questions
Following Dayal (1993, 2016), I assume that a sequence of questions like (5)
constitutes a scope marking question. The intuition is that (5) is more parallel to a
single bi-clausal question like (6b) than to a regular sequence of questions like (6a).
(5) Q: What do you think? What should we buy?
(6) a. Q: Where did you go? What did you buy?
b. Q: What do you think (that) we should buy?
154
— !? —
This grouping is substantiated by the respective canonical answers for (5) and (6a).
The scope marking question in (5) can be answered the same way as (6b), with (7a),
while (6a) can only get answers for each of the questions separately; see (7b).
(7) a. A: I think we should buy cheese. (answer to: (6b) & (5))
b. A: I went to the store. I bought cheese. (answer to: (6a))
Returning to the issue of imperative questions. In Slovenian, imperatives can be
used felicitously in the second question of a scope marking question similar to (5).3
In a context like (8), there are two basic ways to ask for the relevant information.
Due to the possibility of using imperatives in indirect speech in Slovenian (Stegovec
& Kaufmann 2015: see also Section 2), one can use a bi-clausal question like (8a).
The other option is to use a corresponding scope marking question like (8a′).
(8) CONTEXT: Paula sends me to the liquor store to buy some drinks for her
birthday party, and I go there with Marcin. By the time we get there, I’ve
already forgotten what I’m supposed to buy, so I call Paula on the phone to
ask her. After this Marcin, who didn’t hear our phone call, can ask me:
a. Kaj
what
je
AUX.3
rekla,
said.F
da
that
kupi?
buy.IMP.(2)
(wh-extraction)
‘What did she say you should buy?’
a′. Kaj
what
je
AUX.3
rekla?
said.F
Kaj
what
kupi?
buy.IMP.(2)
(scope marking)
‘What did she say? What should you buy?’
Both questions are genuinely information seeking and they are equivalent in the
same way (5) and (6b) are equivalent. Importantly, the second question in (8a′)
is also an imperative; it is essentially identical to the infelicitous question in (3a)
and thus constitutes a counterexample even to a weakened version of the “ban on
imperative questions” that considers only information seeking questions.4
Not only is it clear from the context that (8a′) is not an echo question, it can also
be shown it differs syntactically from echo questions. In Slovenian, echo questions
like those in (9a) allow the wh-word to stay in-situ (note also the characteristic
stress), whereas wh-in-situ is impossible if the question asked in the context of (8).
(9) a. KAJ
what
je
AUX.3
rekla?
said.F
Kupi
buy.IMP.(2)
KAJ?
what
(echo questions)
‘WHAT did he say? You should buy WHAT?’
3 The main difference, apart from the imperative itself, is the attitude verb in the first question: ‘say’
vs. ‘think’, since imperatives must be used performatively, which requires them to be uttered.
4 In fact, already (8a) can be seen as a counterexample, as the wh-word originates from the embedded
clause containing the imperative, which can be seen as making that clause simultaneously imperative
and interrogative. However, the point is much clearer and stronger with (8a′), where the string of
words in the relevant clause is identical to that of a corresponding infelicitous matrix question.
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b. #Kaj
what
je
AUX.3
rekla?
said.F
Kupi
buy.IMP.(2)
kaj?
what
(asked in relation to (8))
‘What did he say? What should you buy?’
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the phenomenon
of subject obviation in embedded directive clauses (i.e. imperatives and directive
subjunctives) (Section 2.1) and argue that a parallel restriction also exists in matrix
clauses and that it is actually responsible for the absence of imperatives in matrix
questions (Section 2.2). In Section 3, I derive Generalized Subject Obviation as
a syntactic binding restriction, which indirectly results from the requirement of
the modal operator OPDir — the source of “directive semantics” — to combine
with an expression of type e: a perspectival PRO. In Section 4, I return to scope
marking questions and show that, when coupled with an analysis of them in terms of
indirect dependency (Dayal 1993, 2016), my analysis of imperatives (and directives
in general) correctly predicts them to be possible in scope marking questions.
2 Directive clauses and subject obviation
Two key characteristics of Slovenian imperatives will be crucial for the proposed
analysis of imperative questions. Firstly, imperatives can be embedded as indirect
speech in Slovenian, like in (10) (see Sheppard & Golden 2002; Rus 2005; Dvorˇák
2005; Dvorˇák & Zimmermann 2008; Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015; Stegovec 2016).
(10) Rekel
said.M
je,
AUX.3
da
that
dela-j
work-IMP.(2)
bolje.
better
‘He said you should work better.’ (Sheppard & Golden 2002: 251)
Secondly, imperatives in Slovenian are in complementary distribution with what I
call directive subjunctives, shown in (11), which have the same canonical function as
imperatives (to be elaborated on below). I indicate this shared function by translating
both into English with the modal ‘should’ as the closest equivalent.
(11) Rekel
said.M
je,
AUX.3
da
that
naj
SUB
delam
work.1
bolje.
better
‘He said I should work better.’
The complementary distribution of imperatives and directive subjunctives concerns
the person value of the subject. Imperatives are used when the subject is 2P or
1P inclusive, while directive subjunctives are used with 3P and 1P exclusive sub-
jects. Morpho-syntactically the two differ in that imperatives surface with dedicated
verbal morphology (see above), whereas directive subjunctives are formed with an
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indicative verb in the present tense and the particle ‘naj’,5 which does not inflect.
I will build here on previous work, where I argue that imperatives and directive
subjunctives are essentially syntactically and semantically equivalent, and that their
complementary distribution is only a surface phenomenon (see Stegovec 2016 for
details). What is crucial under this view is that the two form a natural class as
directive clauses (or simply directives) (see (12)) by virtue of both having the same
canonical function of initiating Directive Speech Acts as defined in (13).6
(12) Directive clause.
A clause with the canonical function of a ‘Directive Speech Act’.
(13) Directive Speech Act.
A speech act where the speaker attempts to make an individual or group of
individuals ensure that the non-modal content of the utterance is realized.
I will argue that the crucial property of directives with respect to the issue of
imperative questions is that both imperatives and directive subjunctives give rise to
the phenomenon known as subject obviation. This is what I will turn to next.
2.1 A restriction on embedding — subject obviation
In Slovenian, imperatives and directive subjunctives show the same restriction on the
possible referents of their subjects when embedded. The subject of the embedding
matrix clause and the subject of the embedded subjunctive cannot co-refer, cf. (14).
(14) Rekel
said.M
jei,
AUX.3
da
that
naj
SUB
si
self.DAT
pomagak,∗i!
help.3
‘Hei said hek,∗i should help himself!’
This restriction is known as subject obviation (see, among others, Picallo 1985;
Quer 2006), a restriction most commonly associated with embedded subjunctives
in Romance languages. However, in Slovenian, where imperatives may also be
embedded, the same restriction can also be observed with imperatives.
This is shown in (15); an embedded imperative with a 2P singular subject is
impossible when the matrix subject is also 2P singular. In other words, when the two
subjects co-refer (see Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015 for the original observation).7
5 This “subjunctive particle” also appears outside directive subjunctives, where it is not limited to
3P and 1P exclusive subjects. I assume that this is the result of under-specification of ‘naj’ (the
vocabulary item). Crucially, only the directive use of ‘naj’ shows the properties discussed below.
6 The definition of Directive Speech Acts is roughly based on that from Searle (1976), but adapted so
that the relevant individual or group of individuals may also not include the addressee.
7 Subject obviation also occurs with plural/dual subjects, but additional considerations apply when
singular matrix subjects co-occur with plural/dual embedded subjects. The restriction then occurs
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(15) *Rekel
said.M
sii,
AUX.2
da
that
si
self.DAT
pomaga-ji!
help-IMP.(2)
int.: ‘Youi said youi should help yourself!’
Just as with the “ban on imperative questions”, the banned constructions can be
felicitously paraphrased; e.g. subject obviation is absent with modal+infinitive
constructions corresponding to the banned imperative/directive subjunctive:8
(16) CONTEXT: I say ‘Exercise more!’ to myself in the mirror. Later I can report:
a. *Rekel
said.M
semi,
AUX.1
da
that
naj
SUB
vecˇ
more
telovadimi!
exercise.1
(obviation)
a′. Rekel
said.M
semi,
AUX.1
da
that
morami
should.1
vecˇ
more
telovadit!
exercise.INF
(no obviation)
‘Ii said Ii should exercise more.’
2.2 Matrix subject obviation
I will suggest that subject obviation is in fact not limited to embedded clauses, and
that it should be viewed more generally as the inability of the subject of directives to
refer to the attitude holder (see also Stegovec 2016).9 This take on subject obviation
leads us to expect that it has an equivalent in matrix clauses, and I argue that it does.
Recall that imperatives and directive subjunctives are in complementary distribu-
tion with respect to the person of the subject, which is also the case in matrix clauses.
However, apart from this, there is a gap in possible subjects that can be observed
when we look at matrix directives together as a whole. Excluding questions, the
subject of a directive cannot refer to (just) the speaker. That is, the subject can never
be 1P singular or 1P exclusive (this is illustrated in Table 1).10 Note that this gap
with distributive plurals/duals and not with collective ones (see Stegovec 2016 regarding how this
relates to Safir’s 2004 observation concerning distributive/collective plurals and binding restrictions).
8 Interestingly, (16a′) improves markedly when the “addressee” in the mirror is made explicit. That is,
when it is expressed in the matrix clause by a dative reflexive clitic co-referential with the subject:
(i) ?Rekel
said.M
semi
AUX.1
sii,
self.DAT
da
that
naj
SUB
vecˇ
more
telovadimi!
exercise.1
‘Ii said to myselfi Ii should exercise more.’
This may be because subject obviation only seems to apply to de se embedded attitudes (see Schlenker
2005a; Szabolcsi 2010; Zu 2016), since it is my intuition that subject obviation is voided in (1) only if
the “directed entity” is interpreted as the speaker’s reflection and not when the speaker self-identifies
with it. See also Section 3.3 regarding self-ascription in directives and Stegovec 2016 for other
non-de se contexts in Slovenian where subject obviation is lifted.
9 See Zu 2016 for a similar point based on the conjunct-disjunct marking alternation in Newari.
10 Crucially, 1P inclusive subjects are possible in matrix contexts just as collective plural/dual subjects
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Help! SINGULAR DUAL PLURAL
*1P (excl.) *naj pomaga-m *naj pomaga-va *naj pomaga-mo
1P+2P (incl.) IMPOSSIBLE pomaga-j-va pomaga-j-mo
2P pomaga-j pomaga-j-ta pomaga-j-te
3P naj pomaga naj pomaga-ta naj pomaga-jo
Table 1 Subject gaps in directives — non-questions
Q+Help!? SINGULAR DUAL PLURAL
1P (excl.) naj pomaga-m? naj pomaga-va? naj pomaga-mo?
*1P+2P (incl.) IMPOSSIBLE *pomaga-j-va? *pomaga-j-mo?
*2P *pomaga-j? *pomaga-j-ta? *pomaga-j-te
3P naj pomaga? naj pomaga-ta? naj pomaga-jo?
Table 2 Subject gaps in directives — questions
is not observed with embedded directives (cf. (11), where the directive subjunctive
has a 1P singular subject). In contrast, when directives are used in questions, the
subject may be 1P singular or 1P exclusive, but it may never be 2P or 1P inclusive:
the subject cannot refer to the addressee (this is illustrated in Table 2).
The 2P gap in questions is essentially what was described above as the “ban on
imperative questions”, illustrated again in (17a). But directives in general are not
banned in questions, as evidenced by the directive subjunctive in (17b).
(17) a. *Pomaga-j
help-IMP-2
mu?
3.M.DAT
‘Should you help him?’
b. Naj
SUB
mu
3.M.DAT
pomagam?
help.1
‘Should I help him?’
What is important is that, while keeping the subjects constant, the availability of the
two kinds of directives is reversed in non-questions, as illustrated in (18).
(18) a. Pomaga-j
help-IMP-2
mu!
3.M.DAT
‘Help him!’
b. *Naj
SUB
mu
3.M.DAT
pomagam!
help.1
int.: ‘I should help him!’
I propose that these matrix subject gaps in directives and the traditional subject
obviation are manifestations of the same ban against subjects referring to the attitude
are in embedded contexts (see footnote 7). As observed by Schlenker (2005b), 1P seems to tolerate
partial co-reference more readily than other persons, and in Stegovec 2016 I suggest that 1P inclusive
subjects of imperatives (“exhortatives”) in particular seem to require a collective interpretation.
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holder, a Generalized Subject Obviation. The attitude holder in non-questions is the
speaker, so subjects that refer to the speaker (1P.SG/excl.) are excluded. Conversely,
the attitude holder in questions is the addressee, so subjects that refer to the addressee
(2P/1P.incl.) are excluded. If this view is correct, a separate mechanism banning
imperative questions like (17a) is not needed. As discussed in Section 4, this can
also explain why imperatives are allowed in scope marking questions in Slovenian.
Before proceeding to derive this restriction, let me flash out a bit more the
logic behind the idea that the putative “ban on imperative questions” is merely the
result of Generalized Subject Obviation. In Slovenian, imperatives must have 2P/1P
inclusive subjects that refer to (groups including) the addressee, and in questions
the attitude holder is the addressee. Therefore, if Generalized Subject Obviation
holds, imperatives specifically cannot be used in questions because their subject
will always refer to (a group that includes) the addressee, and the attitude holder
in questions is also the addressee. This extends also to other languages, since as
far as I am aware, person based complementary distribution between imperatives
and other directives is always such that imperatives are required either for only 2P
subjects or for both 2P and 1P inclusive subjects. The account, however, also makes
the stronger prediction that even without the complementary distribution, 2P and 1P
inclusive subjects will be excluded with any kind of directive used in a question.
The open question now is what exactly is the special property of directives that
makes them give rise to subject obviation.11 As I already noted in the introduction,
something must be special about both imperatives (more generally directives) and
certain questions which makes sentences like (17a) impossible. In the following
section I will first propose that what makes directives special is that they semantically
and syntactically encode the perspective of the attitude holder. Following that, I
will show how changing the attitude holder interacts with this property, focusing on
how the addressee comes to be the attitude holder specifically in matrix information
seeking questions and why this does not take place in scope marking questions.
3 Deriving “the ban”
3.1 How are directive clauses special?
An imperative cannot be “denied” by its speaker. In other words, distancing oneself
from a Directive Speech Act is impossible (see also Kaufmann 2012; Condoravdi
& Lauer 2012; Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015). This is illustrated with the Slovenian
example in (19), where the imperative is followed up by the speaker’s “denial” of
his or her original direction, resulting in the whole utterance being infelicitous.
11 Note that from now on subject obviation means Generalized Subject Obviation unless stated otherwise.
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(19) #Pomaga-j
help-IMP.(2)
mu!
3.M.DAT
Ampak
but
nocˇem,
not.want.1
da
that
mu
3.M.DAT
pomagaš.
help.2
‘Help him! But I don’t want you to help him.’
Interestingly, the restriction changes for imperatives in speech reports (Stegovec &
Kaufmann 2015). Distancing is then allowed for the speaker in the actual context
(= S@), as in (20a), but not for the original speaker (= S1), as shown in (20b).12
(20) Rekel
said.M
jei,
AUX.3
da
that
mu
3.M.DAT
pomaga-j,
help-IMP.(2)
. . .
. . .
‘Hei said you should help him . . . ’
a. . . .
. . .
ampak
but
nocˇem,
not.want.1
da
that
mu
3.M.DAT
pomagaš
help.2
‘. . . but I don’t want you to help him.’
b. # . . .
. . .
ampak
but
da
that
nocˇei,
not.want.3
da
that
mu
3.M.DAT
pomagaš
help.2
‘. . . but that hei doesn’t want you to help him.’
Similarly, an imperative where S@ attempts to ensure P (or P!) cannot be followed
immediately by one with which he or she attempts to ensure ¬P (or ¬P!), as shown
in (21). Once again, the restriction is different with an embedded imperative P! like
(22), which S@ may follow up with ¬P!, as in (22a), while S@ may not follow up
with a report of S1 previously expressing ¬P!, which is illustrated in (22b).13
(21) #Pomaga-j
help-IMP.(2)
mu!
3.M.DAT
Ampak
but
ne
not
pomaga-j
help-IMP.(2)
mu!
3.M.DAT
‘Help him! But don’t help him!’
(22) Rekel
said.M
jei,
AUX.3
da
that
mu
3.M.DAT
pomaga-j,
help-IMP.(2)
. . .
. . .
‘Hei said you should help him . . . ’
a. . . .
. . .
ampak
but
ne
not
pomaga-j
help-IMP.(2)
mu!
3.M.DAT
‘. . . but don’t help him.’
12 (20a) and (20b) are not exact minimal pairs. This is because if the first complementizer in (20b) were
left out this would yield a reading where S@ is implying that S1’s direction (= P!) was not truthful.
Similarly, if the complementizer were to be added in the same position in (20a), the interpretation
would have to be that S1 also said “that S@ does not want P!”. Therefore, in order to avoid these
readings, the two continuations of (20) are phrased so that they only reflect S@’s attitude towards P!.
13 Note that some Slovenian speakers do not allow negative perfective imperatives, which they must
replace with “surrogate” infinitive forms (cf. Zanuttini 1997). For those speakers, the judgments are
the same when the negation+infinitive form is used in examples comparable to (21) and (22).
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b. # . . .
. . .
ampak
but
da
that
mu
3.M.DAT
ne
not
pomaga-j.
help-IMP.(2)
‘. . . but that you shouldn’t help him.’
Therefore, while distancing by the actual speaker is impossible in matrix imperatives,
it is possible with embedded imperatives. However, with the latter distancing is
impossible for the original speaker, who is referred to by the matrix subject. Note
that, just as with subject obviation, we can generalize this to a ban on distancing by
the attitude holder. Crucially, as shown in Stegovec 2016 (but left out here in the
interest of space), directive subjunctives pattern the same in this regard.
This kind of ban on distancing is not only present with directives. It is also
present with modal constructions when used performatively (see Condoravdi &
Lauer 2012). But modal constructions differ from directives in that the former can,
but need not to, be used performatively. This contrasts with directives, which must
be used performatively (more on this in Section 3.2). Consequently, despite the
specification of the source of the direction, the imperative in (23a) does not allow
speaker distancing. Contrast this with (23b), where distancing is possible under the
reading where the speaker disagrees with the recipe. This is even easier in (23c),
where the passive seems to block a directive interpretation of the first sentence.
(23) a. According to the recipe, put in the peppers now.
#But I don’t think you should do that.
b. According to the recipe, you have to put in the peppers now.
(#)But I don’t think you should do that.
c. According to the recipe, the peppers have to be put in now.
But I don’t think you should do that.
I will propose that this contrast in the availability of distancing is due to the fact that
the semantic component of imperatives (and directives in general) involves a modal
explicitly anchored to the attitude holder. Furthermore, I will argue that the special
kind of modal operator that is required for this kind of explicit anchoring to attitude
holders is also the source of subject obviation and is therefore also the reason why
imperatives are impossible in matrix information seeking questions.
3.2 Centered modal operators & perspectival PROs
In my analysis I will build on the so called performative modal approach to im-
perative semantics, as developed in Kaufmann 2012. Under this view the semantic
contribution of imperatives comes down to a modal operator (OPImp) whose ‘at-
issue’ meaning is that of a modal (à la Kratzer 1981, 2012), summarized in (24).
(24) JOPImpKc = JmustKc = λ f . λg . λ p . λw . (∀w′ ∈ O( f ,g,w))[p(w′)]
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a. f = the modal base (the body of information)
b. g = the ordering source (criteria for comparing worlds compliant with f )
c. where O( f ,g,w) is defined as the set of worlds conforming to f at w
(i.e., in
⋂
f (w)) that are the best according to g at w.
OPImp therefore quantifies over possible worlds just like its modal verb counterpart,
whereas their differences in use and distribution come strictly from an additional
presuppositional meaning component which restricts their felicitous use to contexts
where their modal declarative equivalents can be used performatively.
What will matter most for the analysis I entertain here are the conversational
backgrounds (Kratzer 1981) on which the meaning of the modal depends on. With a
regular modal, these are functions from worlds to sets of propositions: the modal
base ( f ) and ordering source (g). The first yields a (necessarily consistent) body of
information, and the second induces an ordering among the worlds that comply with
the first (and can be inconsistent). I propose that, unlike regular modal constructions,
directives involve a special kind of modal — the directive operator (OPDir), whose
denotation employs a special kind of conversational backgrounds that explicitly
encode an individual’s perspective. The denotation of OPDir is given in (25).
(25) JOPDirKc = λ f . λg . λ p . λx . λw . (∀w′ ∈ O( fx,gx,w))[p(w′)]
The only difference between (24) and (25) is in that the latter directly encodes
the attitude holder’s preference via the added type e variable restricting the choice
of conversational backgrounds. This variable comes to be bound by the attitude
holder by means discussed in the next section, resulting in the modal base and
ordering source ofOPDir becoming “centered” to the same entity (x), hence: centered
comversational backgrounds. The contribution of the modal base and ordering source
in OPDir in relation to x is summarized in (26) (cf. the plain modal in (24)).
(26) a. Centered modal base:
fx = the body of information available to x
b. Centered ordering source:
gx = criteria for comparing worlds compliant with fx and endorsed by x
c. where O(w, fx,gx) is defined as the set of worlds conforming to fx at w that
are best according to gx at w.
This added variable does not only encode the perspective of the attitude holder, it is
indirectly also the trigger for the subject obviation effect. In order for the x variable
to receive a denotation, OPDir must combine with a type e element. I propose that
in directives that give rise to subject obviation, this role is filled by a “perspectival
PRO”, which combines with the phrase projected by OPDir in the syntax.14
14 See Section 4.1 for a brief discussion on whether or not other type e elements may fill this role.
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3.3 Subject obviation/the ban as Condition B
I follow the line of approaches to subject obviation that treat it as a syntactic binding
restriction (see Picallo 1985; Kempchinsky 1986, 2009; Rizzi 1990; Progovac 1993;
Bianchi 2001).15 Specifically, I propose that the perspectival PRO, required due to
OPDir (see above), resides in the same binding domain as the subject. Therefore,
pronominal subjects of directives co-referential with the c-commanding prespectival
PRO are excluded by Condition B (more on this below). In embedded contexts,
the perspectival PRO is the proxy for the matrix subject, which “binds” it just like
it “binds” regular argumental PRO is in subject control infinitives, so the ban on
co-reference between perspectival PRO and the subject of the directive is effectively
a ban on co-reference between the matrix and embedded subject. I use scare quotes
with “binding” because I will argue that syntactic binding via c-command is in fact
not the mechanism by which PRO becomes co-referential with the matrix subject,
but that the relevant relation is self-ascription (see Lewis 1979; Chierchia 1987;
Pearson 2012, 2016). This will be crucial with the discussion of subject obviation in
matrix clauses and scope marking questions. However, for the sake of exposition, I
continue to use binding informally to refer to this relation.
Let us take a closer look at how subject obviation arises. In control infinitives
like (27a), an object pronoun of the infinitive clause cannot be co-referential with
the PRO subject due to Condition B. However, in a directive, PRO and the subject
are two distinct elements, so Condition B applies to the latter, as in (27b).
(27) a. *Hei promised [ PROi to shave himi ]. (infinitive + Condition B)
binding 7Condition B
b. *Hei said [ that PROi OPi [ proi help him ]]. (directive + Condition B)
binding 7Condition B
It is crucial that the extra structure containing OPDir and the perspectival PRO
is only present in directives (or other subject obviation yielding clauses),16 and
15 The other main alternative to Subject Obviation is the so called competition approach (see Bouchard
1982; Farkas 1992; Schlenker 2005a; Szabolcsi 2010; Zu 2016), where co-referring subjects are
disallowed with subjunctives and other similar constructions due to the existence of a competing
construction which is dedicated explicitly to co-referring subjects (typically control infinitives). The
latter thus blocks the former from being used specifically in the context of co-referring matrix and
embedded subjects (more exactly de se attitudes; see below). Due to reasons of space, I cannot go into
detail about why I do not adopt such an approach. But in short, directives are never in competition
with infinitive clauses in Slovenian, as the two never occur in the same syntactic contexts. In other
words, they are never selected as complements by the same attitude verbs, so one cannot block the
use of the other. See Stegovec 2016 for a more detailed discussion.
16 This extra structure above the subject but below the complementizer can be thought of in terms of
OPDir being the head of a MoodP projection above TP and below CP (see Stegovec 2016).
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that perspectival PRO and subject pro are in the same binding domain, whereas
perspectival PRO and the object are not (in contrast with infinitival PRO subjects).17
The principle is the same with subject obviation in matrix clauses. However,
the means by which perspectival PRO comes to be bound differ slightly. Because
there is no embedding clause, the perspectival PRO is instead “bound” by means
of attitude operators (Pearson 2012), causing PRO to refer to the speaker (= 1) in
non-questions (via COMMIT) and the addressee (= 2) in questions (via ASK).18 This
results in non-question directives disallowing 1P.excl. subjects, as shown in (28a),
and directives in questions disallowing 2P/1P.incl. subjects, as shown in (28b).
(28) a. *[ COMMIT [ PRO1 OP1 [ pro1 leave ]]] (non-question)
speaker 7Condition B
b. *[ ASK [ Q [ PRO2 OP2 [ pro2 leave ]]]] (question)
addressee 7Condition B
Recall once again that directives surface as imperatives in Slovenian only with
subjects that refer to either the addressee or a group of people including the addressee
(that means 2P and 1P inclusive subjects). This in turn means that (28b) will always
apply with imperatives in questions. As I have already argued above, this effectively
bans the use of imperatives in matrix questions. However, it also predicts that the
ban can be voided even in questions should the ASK operator be absent, since then
the perspectival PRO may also refer to entities other than the addressee. This is, in
fact, what I will argue is the case in scope marking questions.
In order to elaborate on the nature of the attitudinal operators COMMIT and
ASK, I must first discuss the notion of self-ascription. According to an influential
family of approaches to control (see, among others, Lewis 1979; Chierchia 1987;
Pearson 2012, 2016) the relation between a matrix subject and a PRO subject of
an embedded infinitive amounts to self-ascription. Under this view of control, “co-
reference” between the attitude holder (matrix subject) and PRO results from attitude
verbs/operators quantifying over sets of world-individual pairs or centered worlds.
For instance, the relevant set for belief attitudes is the set of doxastic alternatives:
17 The exact nature of the domains is not crucial for the account as long as the CP comprises of two
binding domains: one containing the external and internal arguments, and the other containing the
external argument and perspectival PRO. I suggest in Stegovec (2016) that this can be though of in
terms of Condition B being phase-bound, the two domains being the vP and the CP phase respectively
(Chomsky 2000). The privileged status of the external argument as being in both binding domains
can be attributed to its position at the edge of the vP phase which makes it visible from the CP phase.
18 Pearson’s (2012) original names for the two attitude operators are ASSERT and QUEST respectively.
However, I renamed them here in order to avoid any confusion about whether ASSERT also necessarily
implies an assertive speech act — it does not. This finer point was not crucial for Pearson, but for the
matter at hand it is crucial to dissociate the attitude operators from any specific speech acts.
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(29) Doxastic alternatives (belief). Doxx,w = {< w′,y > : it is compatible with
what x believes in w for x to be y in w′}
In the case of a control infinitive like (30), the subject PRO in CP2 receives a referent
by virtue of the attitude verb ‘expect’ quantifying over Doxx,w (cf. (30a)). The
centered proposition (or property) expressed by CP2 (cf. (30b)) thus becomes self-
ascribed by the subject of the matrix attitude verb, in this case ‘John’ (cf. (30c)).19
(30) [CP1 John expects [CP2 PRO to become rich and famous ]].
a. JexpectKc,g = λP<e,<s,t>>λxλw .∀<w′,y> [<w′,y>∈Doxx,w→P(y)(w′)]
b. JCP2Kc,g = λxλw . x becomes rich and famous in w
c. JCP1Kc,g = λw .∀< w′,y > [< w′,y >∈DoxJohn,w→ y becomes rich and
famous in w′] (based on Pearson 2016: 7)
I suggest that perspectival PRO in embedded directives receives its denotation
essentially the same way. The only differences are that the particular attitude verbs
quantifying over the embedded proposition are different and the fact that PRO only
serves to center the conversational backgrounds of OPDir and not the proposition
expressed by the verb phrase. This also means that, just as subject PRO must be
construed as de se, so must the perspectival PRO. That this is correct can be shown
through a complicated “mistaken identity” scenario discussed in Stegovec (2016).
For current purposes, it suffices to say that my analysis captures the intuition that
the source of a Directive Speech Act must always also self-identify as such.20
Turning now to matrix clauses. I follow Pearson (2012) in also treating matrix
clauses as centered propositions dominated by attitude operators. These are crucially
not “abstract” attitude verbs (cf. performative hypothesis; Ross 1970), but merely
introduce a definedness condition ensuring that the propositions are centered to the
speaker in the scope of COMMIT (31) and the addressee in the scope of ASK (32).
(31) JCOMMITKc,g = λP<e,<s,t>> : ∀<w′,y> [<w′,y>∈Doxspeaker(c),world(c)→
P(y)(w′)] .P
(32) JASKKc,g = λQ<<e,<s,t>>, t> : ∀P[P ∈ Q→∃< w,x > [< w,x >∈
Doxspkr(c),wrld(c)∧ ∀<w′,y> [<w′,y>∈Doxaddressee(c),w→P(y)(w′)]]] .Q
As you may have noticed, ASK does not combine directly with a centered proposition
(= P) like COMMIT. It combines instead with a set of centered propositions (= Q).
This ensures that ASK may only combine with questions, which I assume are sets of
centered propositions resulting from a Q operator (cf. (28b)); Q takes the centered
proposition expressed by a clause and returns a set of centered propositions.
19 I systematically ignore any reference to tense in the discussion of self-ascription (also with the attitude
operators below) for ease of exposition and since it is not relevant for the discussion at hand.
20 See also footnote 8 regarding subject obviation and (non-)de se attitudes.
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The consequence of the two attitudinal operators when combined with a directive
is that a non-question P receives an interpretation only when the denotation of
perspectival PRO is the speaker (due to COMMIT; see (31)), whereas a question Q
receives an interpretation only when the denotation of PRO is the addressee (due to
ASK; see (32)). In other words, the perspectival PRO of a directive clause may only
refer to the speaker in non-questions and to the addressee in questions, which in turn
yields the subject obviation pattern illustrated above in (28). Following the reasoning
used above, this then also derives the absence of matrix imperative questions, as
they are predicted to always give rise to subject obviation. But what makes scope
marking questions exempt from this restriction? I address this in the next section.
4 Directive clauses in scope marking questions
I adopt an inderect dependency view of scope marking questions following Dayal
(1993, 2016), where the two questions in a scope marking sequence are not in
a syntactic subordination relation, but combine at the level of semantics through
standard functional application at the level of sets of (centered) propositions.
Recall that in Slovenian scope marking questions like (8a′) (repeated as (33)) al-
low an imperative in the second question. Crucially, the second question is felicitous
despite having the same syntax as the infelicitous matrix imperative questions.
(33) Kaj
what
jei
AUX.3
rekel?
said.M
Kaj
what
kupi?
buy.IMP.(2)
[= (8a′)]
‘What did he say? What should you buy?’
I argue that sequences like (33) do not involve clause embedding in the traditional
sense, but that the two question CPs are adjoined to each other in the manner shown
in (34a), with CP1 quantifying over CP2, as in (34b) (following Dayal 1993, 2016).
(34) a. CP3
CP1
what j C’
did 〈hei〉 say t j
CP2
whatk C’
〈PROi〉 OPi 〈you2〉 buy tk
3Condition B
b. JCP3K = λT<<e,<s,t>>, t> . JCP1K ( JCP2K )
Without going into details about the semantics of questions (which would take us too
far astray),21 the basic idea is that the configuration in (34a) has more in common
21 See Dayal 2016: Ch. 2 for a good brief overview of the semantics of scope marking questions in
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semantically with embedded questions than with matrix ones, despite the lack of
traditional clause embedding. Consider the verb ‘say’ in (33), which I assume takes
centered propositions as complements. In (34a), CP1 is a question where the sought
after information is a centered proposition (roughly: ‘What is the P<e,<s,t>> such
that he said it’), so the question involves quantication over centered propositions
much like a clause embedding ‘say’ would (see above). Following Dayal (2016),
this means that the quantified over variable has a covert restriction (= T ) analogous
to the individual variables that ‘what/who’ bind in a question like CP2. Since the
quantification is over variables of type < e,< s, t >>, the restriction itself is a set of
centered propositions: T<<e,<s,t>>, t>. What this means is that in effect CP3 denotes
only those centered propositions that the subject of CP1 (= ‘hei’) said and are in
the denotation of CP2. In other words, the subject of CP1 self-identifies with the
perspectival PRO in CP2 just as it does in embedded directives, and unlike in matrix
questions, where ASK causes PRO to obligatorily refer to the addressee.
This analysis thus correctly predicts that imperatives can occur in scope marking
questions; the perspectival PRO does not have to refer to the addressee and give rise
to subject obviation with 2P and 1P inclusive subjects. Note also that, just as with
matrix clauses, the adoption of self-ascription over syntactic binding is crucial, as
there is no c-command relation between the subject of CP1 and PRO in CP2.
Another thing the analysis accounts for is the fact that subject obviation is
actually active in scope marking questions. The subject of the first question must
self-identify with a perspectival PRO in the second question, so the subject obviation
pattern is predicted to be identical to that of embedded directives: the subjects of
the two questions cannot co-refer. This is, in fact, the pattern we observe. In (35a),
the subject in the first question and the subject of the directive subjunctive cannot
co-refer. Similarly in (35b), the imperative is banned in the second question because
the subject of the first question is 2P — replicating the matrix question restriction.
(35) a. Kaj
what
jei
AUX.3
rekel?
said.M
Kaj
what
naj
SUB
kupik,∗i?
buy.3
[cf. (14)]
‘What did hei say? What should hek,∗i buy?’
b. *Kaj
what
sii
AUX.2
rekel?
said.M
Kaj
what
kupii?
buy.IMP.(2)
[cf. (15)]
‘What did you say? What should you buy?’
Reducing the “ban on imperative questions” to subject obviation therefore correctly
accounts not only for the fact that imperatives are banned in matrix questions, but
also for the fact that they are allowed in scope marking questions. The different
restriction patterns arise as a conspiracy of the semantic and syntactic requirements
relation to broader issues concerning the semantics of questions; much of this section is based on it.
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introduced by OPDir, the source of “directive semantics” in directives, and the nature
of the quantification over the centered proposition denoted by the directive clause.
4.1 Open questions about cross-linguistic variation
The discussion of the analysis so far focused exclusively on Slovenian, but the lack
of imperatives in questions seems to be a universal or close to universal property of
language. As noted above, if follows from the proposed analysis that any language
with the kind of directive clause structure I argued for should have the same subject
obviation patterns. In languages where the imperative paradigm covers 2P and 1P
inclusive subjects, the pattern is predicted to be the same as in Slovenian. However,
even when a directive does not surface as an imperative it should give rise to subject
obviation. This can be observed in Romance languages, where imperatives cannot
appear in embedded contexts, so they surface as subjunctives instead, crucially
retaining the subject obviation effect (see Kempchinsky 1986, 2009). So the strong
prediction, to be tested, is whether this is universally true, and whether the matrix
version of subject obviation that gives rise to the apparent ban on imperative questions
is also maintained when the use of an imperative is blocked in a similar fashion.
The next question is whether there is variation in terms of what kind of type
e element combines with OPDir. So far we have seen the perspectival PRO fulfill
this role, but there is no semantic requirement that limits the type e expression to
PRO, so any such requirement must be syntactic in nature. This also means that it is
conceivably subject to cross-linguistic variation. For example, if the subject of the
directive was allowed to move to OPDir instead, there would be no subject obviation
and OPDir would be centered to the individual denoted by the subject. This could
be what goes on in Balkan-style embedded subjunctives, which show no subject
obviation effects and pattern more with control infinitives (see Quer 2006: 674–676).
Similarly, extending further to the realm of matrix directives, this option may also
be required for Korean directives (jussives in the terminology of Zanuttini, Pak &
Portner 2012); if imperatives, exhortatives, and promissives form a natural class, as
suggested by Zanuttini et al. (2012), then promissives are an exception to the ban
on 1P exclusive subjects that results from subject obviation. Crucially, the pattern
is paralleled in embedded contexts, so it could be that in Korean promissives differ
from other directives in that they involve subject-to-OPDir movement as opposed to
a perspectival PRO (see also Stegovec 2016). Note that if such variation exists, it
would result in the current approach only from morpho-syntactic parameterization.
Finally, if the proposed analysis of imperatives in scope marking questions
is correct, why do all languages not pattern with Slovenian? It is possible that
allowing embedded imperatives is somehow a prerequisite for allowing imperatives
in scope marking questions. Interestingly, the otherwise very similar Slovenian
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and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian seem to differ in terms of imperatives in that only
the former allows embedded imperatives, but also in that only the former allows
imperatives in scope marking questions. This connection would, of course, have to
be checked cross-linguistically, but it is an interesting idea to entertain going forward,
given the implications it may have for the theory of scope marking questions.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that there is no “ban on imperative questions” resulting from the
incompatibility of clause types. This was mainly based on the observation that
imperatives are allowed in Slovenian even in true information seeking questions,
specifically in scope marking questions. Building on this, I proposed an alternative
analysis that attributes the absence of imperatives in regular matrix questions to a
matrix version of subject obviation. This analysis not only reduces the ban to an
independent restriction associated with imperatives, and more generally directive
clauses, but also correctly predicts the absence of the ban in scope marking questions,
given an indirect dependency analysis of scope marking (Dayal 1993, 2016).
Going beyond the Slovenian facts, this analysis also has implications concerning
cross-linguistic variation in directives, and perhaps more importantly the theory of
clause types itself. In the proposed analysis, the only relevant distinction between
questions and other types of clauses is arguably their differing semantic types: sets
of (centered) propositions, and (centered) propositions respectively. Similarly, in the
realm of mood and modality, the crucial difference between directives (and any other
subject obviation yielding clauses) and plain modals also boils down to a difference
in semantic type: modals with centered conversational backgrounds versus plain
ones. It would be interesting to explore whether this kind of variation in semantic
type classes could be extended beyond the cases that were discussed in this paper.
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